[Resource Topic] 2000/031: Forward Security in Threshold Signature Schemes

Welcome to the resource topic for 2000/031

Title:
Forward Security in Threshold Signature Schemes

Authors: Michel Abdalla, Sara Miner, Chanathip Namprempre

Abstract:

We consider the usage of forward security with threshold
signature schemes. This means that even if more than the
threshold number of players are compromised, some security remains:
it is not possible to forge signatures relating to the past. In
this paper, we describe the first forward-secure threshold
signature schemes whose parameters (other than signing or verifying
time) do not vary in length with the number of time periods in the
scheme. Both are threshold versions of the Bellare-Miner
forward-secure signature scheme, which is Fiat-Shamir-based. One
scheme uses multiplicative secret sharing, and tolerates mobile
eavesdropping adversaries. The second scheme is based on polynomial
secret sharing, and we prove it forward-secure based on the security
of the Bellare-Miner scheme. We then sketch modifications which
would allow this scheme to tolerate malicious adversaries. Finally,
we give several general constructions which add forward security to
any existing threshold scheme.

ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/031

See all topics related to this paper.

Feel free to post resources that are related to this paper below.

Example resources include: implementations, explanation materials, talks, slides, links to previous discussions on other websites.

For more information, see the rules for Resource Topics .