Welcome to the resource topic for 1999/023
Title:
Concurrent Zero-Knowledge
Authors: Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, Amit Sahai
Abstract:One of the toughest challenges in designing
cryptographic protocols is to design them so that they will remain
secure even when composed. For example, concurrent executions of a
zero-knowledge protocol by a single prover (with one or more
verifiers) may leak information and may not be zero-knowledge in
toto. In this work we:
(1) Suggest time as a mechanism to design concurrent cryptographic
protocols and in particular maintaining zero-knowledge under
concurrent execution.
(2) Introduce the notion of of Deniable Authentication
and connect it to the problem of concurrent zero-knowledge.
We do not assume global synchronization, however we assume an
(alpha,beta) timing constraint: for any two processors P_1
and P_2, if P_1 measures alpha elapsed time on its local
clock and P_2 measures beta elapsed time on its local clock, and
P_2 starts after P_1 does, then P_2 will finish after
P_1 does. We show that for an adversary controlling all the
processors clocks (as well as their communication channels) but
which is constrained by an (alpha,beta) constraint
there exist four-round almost concurrent zero-knowledge interactive proofs
and perfect concurrent zero-knowledge arguments for every language in NP.
We also address the more specific problem of Deniable Authentication,
for which we propose several particularly efficient solutions.
Deniable Authentication is of independent interest, even in the
sequential case; our concurrent solutions yield sequential
solutions, without recourse to timing, i.e., in the standard model.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/1999/023
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