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Title:
Simple Power Analysis assisted Chosen Cipher-Text Attack on ML-KEM
Authors: Alexandre Berzati, Andersson Calle Viera, Maya Chartouny, David Vigilant
Abstract:Recent work proposed by Bernstein et al. (from EPRINT 2024) identified two timing attacks, KyberSlash1 and KyberSlash2, targeting ML-KEM decryption and encryption algorithms, respectively, enabling efficient recovery of secret keys. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, correctives were promptly applied across implementations. In this paper, we demonstrate a very simple side-channel-assisted power analysis attack on the patched implementations of ML-KEM. Our result showed that original timing leakage can be shifted to power consumption leakage that can be exploited on specific data. We performed a practical validation of this attack on both the standard and a shuffled implementations of ML-KEM on a Cortex-M4 platform, confirming its effectiveness. Our approach enables the recovery of the ML-KEM secret key in just 30 seconds for the standard implementation, and approximately 3 hours for the shuffled implementation, achieving a 100% success rate in both cases.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2051
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