Welcome to the resource topic for 2019/293
Title:
Impossibility of Strong KDM Security with Auxiliary Input
Authors: Cody Freitag, Ilan Komargodski, Rafael Pass
Abstract:In this note, we show that a strong notion of KDM security cannot be obtained by any encryption scheme in the auxiliary input setting, assuming Learning With Errors (LWE) and one-way permutations. The notion of security we deal with guarantees that for any (possibly inefficient) function f, it is computationally hard to distinguish between an encryption of 0s and an encryption of f(pk, z), where pk is the public key and z is the auxiliary input. Furthermore, we show that this holds even when restricted to bounded-length auxiliary input where z is much shorter than pk under the additional assumption that (non-leveled) fully homomorphic encryption exists.
ePrint: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/293
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